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  The Strategy and Tactics of the Scottish Armies 1296-1314  

The Strategy and Tactics of the Scottish Armies 1296-1314

Ewan J. Innes, MA(Hons Scot. Hist.) FSA Scot


Synopsis:  This essay describes the strategy and tactics used by the commanders of the Scottish armies during the period 1296 to 1314.

Please see my copyright policy if you wish to cite any part of this essay.


A major consequence of the invasion of Scotland by the army of Edward I in 1296, was the necessity for a radical review and revision by the Scots of their military tactics. Prior to the invasion, the Scots had, to a certain extent, obeyed the chivalrous rules of engagement used throughout the Christian world. These rules were that when armies met, any battle which took place would normally be between the opposing heavy cavalry who would charge each other, the foot being relatively redundant.

This however proved inadequate against the well trained, well led, well armed and experienced English heavy cavalry and foot, including contingents of Welsh archers and spearmen.

Thus, the Scottish leaders developed the strategy of trying, wherever possible, to pick the site and make the ground fight for them. The superior numbers which the English invariably had would thus be negated and the Scots would have a better chance of success. This policy of quasi-guerrilla warfare adapted to the Scottish needs was only introduced after Dunbar and the ensuing military disasters.1

Developed alongside this was a new tactic, the use of light horse or hobelar. The use of light horse seems to have been brought over from Ireland in the first instance by Edward I as a means of bringing the Scots to battle. His heavy feudal army could not follow a mobile army which retired to the hills and marshes when confronted, as the armies under Wallace and Bruce habitually did.2 The hobelar was used by the Scots as a means of gaining the element of speed and surprise, essential for success, thus allowing them to engage the enemy at times and places of their choosing. The light horse were used as raiding parties under Bruce, but Wallace also employed bodies of foot soldiers.

The Scots developed a distinctive tactic in the deployment of this type of army. Whereas the English nobility scorned the value of the footsoldier in favour of heavily armed, mailclad, knights, the Scottish leaders placed greater emphasis on well trained, mobile, lightly armed footsoldiers and light horsemen.

Chapter I

The beginning of war:- Berwick to Dunbar

The Scots had had little military practice during the reign of Alexander III, the only action being between King Hakon of Norway and Alexander at Largs in 1263.3 Consequently, they were ill-prepared to cope with an English invasion.

Before Edward had reached Scotland in 1296, a Scottish army crossed into England and, with a ferocity which almost rivalled Edward, ravaged Redesdale and Tynedale and burned the towns of Corbridge and Carlisle and the monasteries of Lanercost and Hexham. The reasons for this seem to be unclear, but it could have been a preemptive strike; it was certainly a policy to be repeatedly used by both Wallace and Bruce.

The Battle of Dunbar

Edward was in no hurry to complete the conquest when he was so sure of success. Eventually he sent a cavalry force under John, Earl Warenne to take Dunbar. Warenne, who had begun the siege of Dunbar[Map A (1)] was attacked by the "feudal host of Scotland".4[Map A (2)]

Warenne turned westward with his continental veterans to meet the Scots as they marched over Spottsmuir. Before the English could reach the Scots, they had to descend into a hollow [Map A (3)] through which flowed the Spott Burn. The Scots observing this action believed the English to be fleeing and charged. [Map A (4)] The English however were not fleeing and formed up in good order, throwing back the charge and setting about the broken ranks.[Map A (5)] A massacre then ensued and there were heavy casualties among the Scottish foot.5[Map A (6)] Dunbar is especially notable not only for the spectacular failure of the Scottish feudal host- the official military might of the Crown- but also for the large numbers of distinguished prisoners taken.

The example of Dunbar was not lost on the Scottish leadership. The ineptitude of the Scottish tactics contrasted unfavourably with the skill of Warenne in controlling and marshalling his forces, and the lack of discipline and experience of the Scottish army was exposed. Pitched battles would have to be carefully considered before being embarked upon in the future.

Chapter II

From Victory to Defeat: - Stirling Bridge to Falkirk

Stirling Bridge

As William Wallace was leading a growing rebellion in the lowlands early in 1297, news spread of a great rising in the north led by Andrew de Moray. As events progressed, Wallace developed the use of a new tactic, later to be used with great success by Bruce, i.e. the rapid deployment of fast moving light horse to attack and harass English patrols and garrisons. These tactics pinned them back into fixed positions and made control of the countryside- the collection of taxes and provisions- difficult. With his growing success, Wallace had to manage ever greater numbers of men and hence his exploits increased in scale. As the year progressed the English commanders in Scotland grew increasingly anxious. This is shown by the worried letters to the treasury in London from Hugh Cressingham complaining about the impossibility of raising taxes in Scotland as all was in a state of unrest.6

In the North, Moray had cleared out most of the English forces and linked up his forces with those of Wallace some time during the August of 1297 thereby creating a unique force, composed of both Lowlanders and Highlanders. There was a set back with the surrender at Irvine in July 1297 of an army under the command of the Earl of Carrick, Robert Bruce and Sir William Douglas. They could be seen as being the more traditional leaders, in the eyes of the country, than Wallace and Moray, but they may have had less stomach for the fight.

An English army charged with subduing Scotland left Berwick at the end of August 1297 and marched towards Stirling under the joint command of Hugh Cressingham and John de Warenne, the Earl of Surrey. The force, including many Welsh, reached Stirling on the 10th of September and was faced by a Scottish force drawn up on the foothills of the Ochils and on the Abbey Craig which overlooked the mile long causeway linking the only bridge across the River Forth to the dry ground and Stirling castle. On the morning of the 11th of September a large force of heavy cavalry and foot marched across the narrow bridge, two abreast, under the watching eyes of the Scots.[Map B (1)]

When it was deemed enough English troops had crossed, the Scots forces were given the order to charge and a group of spearmen - hidden from the eyes of the English - set off[Map B (2)] and succeeded in cutting off the bridgehead which had been formed. The English troops who had crossed the bridge were cut off from help[Map B (3)], and were duly massacred while the greater part of the English army watched helpless on the other side of the Forth.[Map B (4)]

The blame for the loss of the battle of Stirling bridge could be placed upon Hugh Cressingham who, on grounds of expense, turned back reinforcements on the way to Stirling and who on the day of the battle turned down an idea for an outflanking manoeuvre7 for the same reason.[Map B (1a)] The tactical skill which was shown by Wallace and Moray does lend them some credit, yet it was the inept generalship shown by Warenne and Cressingham on this occasion that won the day for the Scots. However the idea of footsoldiers in an offensive role is of great interest.

The tactical positioning (as shown on the map) had obviously been worked out well beforehand and the planning of the battle had, it would seem, taken up a large part of the Scots time. The timing of the rush down the causeway was crucial to the success of the Scots as, had too many English troops been allowed to cross, the final outcome could have been drastically different.

It should also be pointed out that the troops who had beaten this large semi-professional English army- a balanced force of cavalry, archers and heavy foot- were the landless peasants and not the great Scottish lords.

The Scots now had to prepare themselves for the wrath which Edward I would surely vent on his return from campaigning in France. Scotland suffered great misfortune with the death of Andrew de Moray (possibly due to wounds received at the battle) and subsequently Wallace was left in sole control of the Scottish forces and ultimately the whole country.

The Battle of Falkirk

Wallace spent the time between the victory at Stirling and the invasion by Edward I training his forces. He now had the power, having been made Guardian, to issue a general summons to raise an army. He organised these soldiers into divisions to guard the possible landing sites for English troops sailing from the continent.

The number and quality of the English forces raised by Edward can be seen as a reflection of his wrath and determination to wreak revenge- 2000 horse & 12000 foot, all veterans of the Flanders campaign.

When Edward invaded in the summer of 1298 he found a barren and wasted land in front of him, for Wallace had engaged upon a policy of 'scorched earth' in order to frustrate the English king's attempts at subduing him. Bruce was to repeat this successful strategy in 1310.

After losing contact with the Scots, Edward received news that they were camped at Falkirk. The greatest fear of the Scots was the English heavy cavalry (it was this fear which had led to the surrender at Irvine). To meet this threat, Wallace arranged his forces in four schiltroms or 'shield-rings' defended by the few Scots archers and fronted by sharpened stakes and ropes.[Map C (1)] Behind him lay a wooded area (an extension of Callendar Wood & the Torwood) and in front ran the River Avon. His forces were arrayed "on hard ground on one side of a hill beside Falkirk"8

The Scots position was not as strong as at Stirling, yet it was adequate for the type of defensive battle Wallace intended fighting. His men had been trained to fight in a strong defensive formation where they stood or sat in ranks, with their 20 feet long pikes slanting at all angles, the aim being to bring down the charging horses, thereby incapacitating the mail clad knights.

The events at Falkirk are well documented by Guisborough, although there are other sources of information available. The battle of Falkirk is a good example of superior generalship overwhelming a strong opposition. The English cavalry ignored Edward's proposal for a halt until the foot had eaten, and advanced in two separate "battles" or brigades until they encountered the marsh in front of the Scots position.[Map C (2)] They then swung to left and right endeavouring to go round this obstacle. When the English heavy cavalry had carried out this manoeuvre they charged the outer Scots schiltroms. Meanwhile the Scots cavalry, fearing the English feudal might, fled the field.[Map C (2)] The battle now became a contest between the Scots peasantry in their schiltroms and the English nobility, and at first the Scots held their ground. The English cavalry, having ridden down the Scottish archers,[Map C (3)] could make no headway against the solid ranks of pikes. At this point the Welsh archers and Gascon crossbowmen moved forward to bring their weapons to bear on the immobile Scots.[Map C (4)]

Slowly but surely the gaps in the schiltroms grew and the English cavalry now began to exploit them, and their charge finally broke the schiltroms, this dour long-drawn out battle becoming a massacre.[Map C (5)]

The tactics employed by Wallace of attempting to meet the English on their own terms failed because he could not counter the combined threat of the English cavalry and Welsh archers. The tactics used by Wallace were however generally sound. He had sloping ground to his front with a marsh and river in front of that. Moreover he had a large wooded area behind him through which to escape. However, when his cavalry fled he had no means of dispersing the English archers. This meant that no matter how good a position he had, he could not win the day. Bruce learned by this mistake, and at Bannockburn he had a force of light horse standing by to disperse any English archers who might threaten his position.

The battle of Falkirk was not decisive, in the sense that afterwards the English still did not fully control Scotland, but it is important because not until Bannockburn did the Scots again attempt to fight the English in a pitched battle. The role of Wallace diminished rapidly, as his reputation in the eyes of his contemporaries was built on his military successes. The defeat of Wallace at Falkirk raises the possibility that it was Moray not Wallace who possessed the tactical skill to defeat the English at Stirling bridge. In any case, after Falkirk the war passes into yet another phase, where the Scots teetered on the brink of defeat.

Chapter III

From Defeat to Victory: Methven to Bannockburn.

Between 1298 and 1304 Scotland returned to the old custom of guardianship. Bruce and John Comyn were guardians until 1300, when Bruce resigned. Comyn, Bishop Lamberton and Ingram de Umfraville then led jointly until 1301 when John de Soules was appointed sole guardian. There were no major battles, but English armies were sent north annually between 1300 and 1303 in order to subdue the country which they only effectively controlled in the south west. The castles still in Scottish hands held out but fell after sieges involving huge numbers of English troops.

John Comyn surrendered in 1304, as did most of the others. By 1305 resistance seemed to be at an end. Wallace had finally been caught and executed, but within six months Robert Bruce had killed John Comyn and sat himself upon the throne.

The events which followed King Robert I's coronation in 1306 are well documented, including his rout at Methven9 by Aymer de Valence and his defeat at the hands of John MacDougall of Lorn at Dail Righ at the head of Strathfillan.10 These left him with only a few hundred men and in fear for his own safety. Consequently he fled for the Western Isles, spending the winter of 1306/7 in hiding.

When he returned to Scotland in 1307 his luck seems to have changed. He had a minor military success in Glentrool,11 with the defeat of an English raiding party. At Loudon Hill12 he avenged Methven by forcing Valence to fight on a narrow front, having blocked off the road with earthworks thereby negating the English superiority in numbers. This demonstrated his increasing tactical awareness.

The Pass of Brander

By 1308, due to his successes, some of which are mentioned above, Bruce had changed his military position out of all proportion, being now in control of the greater part of Scotland. He advanced into Argyll following the present day route under the slopes of Ben Cruachan[Map D (1)]- an excellent place for an ambush- where he encountered the forces of John MacDougall hidden on the rocky slopes of the Ben.[Map D (1)] Bruce, no doubt expecting an ambush, had sent a small group of lightly armed men under Douglas scrambling up the slopes in order to get higher up the Ben than the enemy.[Map D (2)]

As the troops of Bruce came into view along the path the Argyll men fired arrows and rolled stones down upon them.[Map D (3)] Even as they did this an answering hail of arrows came from the Highlanders who now charged down the mountainside,[Map D (3)] with the rest of the king's men attempting to scramble up the slope to get at John of Lorn's men. [Map D (3)]

With the Argyll men now caught in a pincer movement they could do nothing but flee with Bruce's men following hotly in pursuit. John of Lorn's troops made it to the only bridge across the River Awe but had to leave it intact because of the speed at which they were being chased.[Map D (4)] This enabled Bruce to reach Dunstaffnage which he at once began to besiege. John of Lorn slipped down Loch Awe in his galley having watched the battle from it.13

The victory for Bruce at Brander avenged Dail Righ and was a supreme example of the change both in his fortunes and in his tactical planning. By sending Douglas to climb Ben Cruachan with lightly armed Highlanders he anticipated an ambush and prepared a contingency plan.

This change in both tactics and strategy seems to have been thought out during Bruce's enforced stay in the isles over the winter of 1306/7. On his return there were risings in both the north and the south at almost the same time. This suggests that planning had taken place, providing Bruce with the chance to use his tactical skill to great effect. He decided to secure his base in North and West Scotland by destroying his enemies' power, before directing his energies on expelling the English. By 1308 he had effective control of Scotland, apart from the English strongholds. Bruce was helped by the death of Edward I because he was effectively left unharassed, thereby giving him the opportunity to destroy his Scottish opponents who had allied themselves with England

The Battle of Bannockburn

Bruce had outstanding successes in the years between Brander and Bannockburn. Chief among these were the captures of castles with no siege equipment and occasionally without the need for a siege. He and his lieutenants employed innovative and audacious tactics which achieved success due to a combination of careful planning, luck and English carelessness. The tactics involved the use of specially constructed rope ladders which could be held up against a castle wall by means of an iron grappling hook. In this way were the castles of Perth (1313) and Roxburgh (1314) taken.

Edward Bruce and the commander of Stirling Castle, Sir Philip Moubray had agreed that the castle would be surrendered unless a relieving army came within 2 miles of the castle by mid-summers day 1314. This left Robert Bruce with no option but to fight a pitched battle with the forces of Edward II, a straight confrontation between the heavy chivalric cavalry of England and the pike armed foot of Scotland.

Bruce spent his time waiting for the English army by training his troops in order to give them a greater tactical advantage than Wallace had had. He did this by training his troops to advance in open order, and when threatened to form a hollow schiltrom, which could then be used to counter attack.

The English army was composed of about 3000 cavalry and 17000 foot although these estimates are continually being revised. Time was running out for Edward to reach Stirling on time and his troops were urged on at great speed and with little rest. Bruce had arranged his 6000 men into four divisions with his small body of horse under the command of Robert Keith positioned in the New Park.

The English forces arrived near Stirling on 23rd June and some of the cavalry pressed forward without waiting for the main body to arrive. The vanguard advanced along the Roman road until they encountered the division of Robert Bruce supported by his brother Edward.[Map Ex (1)] The English were beaten off by the strong Scottish formations and retreated in disarray.

Meanwhile a troop of some 300-800 cavalry14 had advanced through the carse unnoticed by the Scots[Map Ex (1a)] possibly intending a reconnaissance of the position or attempting to relieve Stirling castle. Whatever the case, this force was belatedly challenged by Moray. The English troops saw this challenge as being little more than sport and allowed the Scots to draw up, in a hollow schiltrom with their pikes slanting at all angles in order to bring down the horses. When the Scots had formed up, the English cavalry charged, encircling the schiltrom, but could find no way through. They eventually resorted to throwing their maces and axes in an attempt to break a way through. The schiltrom nevertheless stayed firm. Beaten by this, the English began to waver. At this point Moray began a counter attack from the schiltrom which succeeded in breaking the English, some of whom fled to Stirling Castle and the rest back the way they had come.

Looking at this engagement, it is obvious that the Scots were well trained and drilled, for the movement from defence to attack seems to have taken place quickly. This could only have been done with training and explains why the 'small folk' (the irregular untrained foot) were kept out of the schiltroms where they would have been a liability.

Edward II had now moved the foot up to the region of the New Park and having received news of the setbacks earlier in the day he came to the conclusion that he must bivouac overnight in order to destroy the Scots the next day. The English were in constant fear of a surprise attack and having crossed the Bannock burn[Map Ey (2)] spent the night with their horses bitted. The Scots meanwhile were still debating whether to face the English the next day or whether to retire to Lennox and employ guerrilla warfare tactics. A Scot in the English service turned the tide when he reported to the Scots that morale in the English camp was low.15

The next day the Scots advanced from the New Park in open order by the right, i.e. in echelon, with Edward Bruce's division leading, followed by Moray and then Douglas.[Map Ey (3)] This caught the English by surprise for they did not expect the Scots to move to attack, thereby seizing the initiative vital for their success, and in great haste the vanguard led by Gloucester charged the nearest division (Edward Bruce). They were routed and Gloucester killed.

The English vanguard was now driven back into the main body of the army which was constricted in movement due to their cramped position, almost like a great schiltrom16. This prevented the proper deployment of the various arms of the force. The Scots drove home their advantage with the three divisions of Moray, Douglas and Edward Bruce pressing the English back.[Map Ey (4)] At length a body of archers managed to get out onto the Scots flank and their fire began to take effect17. It was for precisely this situation that Bruce, perhaps with the lessons of Falkirk in mind, had kept the body of light horse apart from the Scottish army and it now charged and dispersed the archers,[Map Ey (5)] "A classic example of the correct use of an inferior force of cavalry"18. With the dispersal of the archers Bruce moved his reserve division up onto the flank of Douglas and the Scots again began to press the English back into the Bannock Burn.[Map Ey (6)] At this point the "small folk" appeared from the forest having been hidden in a valley behind Coxet hill.{Map Ey (7)] To the English this appeared to be a fresh army coming to add to the already overwhelming pressure on them, and consequently the English army broke and the battle became a rout.[Map Ey (8)]

The broken English army fled; the right towards Stirling castle in such numbers that Bruce thought that they would have to be fought next day, the centre towards the Forth where they were destroyed in the marshes and the left into the gorge of the Bannock Burn where they were compressed and many drowned. Edward II and his retinue fled the field, pursued by Douglas and the light horse, and made their escape to Berwick being too strong in numbers to be overcome.

The defeat at Bannockburn was a severe dent to the pride of England for they had been beaten by an army almost entirely composed of foot soldiers, a thing almost unheard of in medieval warfare.19 The tactics employed by Bruce showed how superior a general he was compared to Edward II. His use of the ground and indeed his deployment of both men and horse were masterful. The men were very highly trained, and it was this training, combined with a cohesion between the leaders and their men, cavalry and footsoldiers which gave the Scots victory.

However it must be said that the severe tactical blunders which were committed by the English were also a prime factor, for these gave the Scots a tactical superiority. The English army lacked the vital factor of cohesion between the leaders and the common soldiery. The cavalry tended to act independently of the foot and the jealousies involved severely hampered their actions.

They also chose to fight on a battlefield which made it impossible for them to deploy effectively. This allowed the Scots to dictate the battle and the English paid the price.


The tactics and strategy employed by the Scottish armies between 1296 and 1314 evolved over the period. Wallace began with the lessons of Dunbar in mind and consequently the development of the lightly armed foot soldier was begun. Wallace also used raids into England as part of his overall strategy, both as a means of raising money and as a means of retaliation. The defeat at Falkirk could be seen as a watershed in the use of foot, for afterwards Bruce altered Wallace's schiltroms in order that they could become more mobile and therefore less of a target for English archers.

Robert Bruce, took Wallace's tactical ideas further forward in evolutionary terms for he used raids into England purely as a means of raising finance through blackmail etc. His long term aim was of course the defeat of the English and the removal of their forces from Scotland. Yet he knew that to do this he would need to defeat the English in the field in a major battle.

Overall the tactics and strategy of the Scottish armies came 'full circle' for after 1296 there was a move away from 'normal' feudal warfare towards a form more suited to Scotland's capability in both financial and military terms. The changes were refined and improved over a succession of military campaigns, from defeat at Falkirk to victory at Bannockburn. Following the death of Robert I in 1329, Scottish tactics suffered a regression. At Halidon Hill and Dupplin Moor in 1332 and 1333 the Scottish schiltroms were destroyed by English archers. It would seem therefore that the tactics worked out by Bruce and his lieutenants died with them.


  1. The term 'guerrilla warfare' usually refers to irregular soldiers fighting behind enemy lines, attacking lines of communication and supplies etc. Here, however, I use the term to describe the strategy employed by both Bruce and Wallace of engaging the enemy only when the terrain and logistical conditions were in their favour.
  2. I have found the articles written by J.F. Lydon on the hobelar and its development including its use in 1296 published in editions of The Irish Sword for 1954 and 1962 vols ii & v ("The Hobelar an Irish contribution to Medieval warfare" & "An Irish army in Scotland, 1296") particularly useful in elucidating this short lived component of the late medieval army. Also particularly useful in this respect is an article by J.E. Morris published in the volume of Transactions of the Royal Historical Society for 1914 on the development of "Mounted infantry in medieval warfare". Under Wallace light horse was used in a reconnaissance role. They would report back to the main army any information as regards cattle and the like for the foot to go and deal with.
  3. The king of Norway was determined upon a show of strength over the rule of the Western Isles and sailed for Scotland with a large fleet. (Norwegian estimates are of a fleet of 160 ships and 20,000 men, a possible exaggeration). When Hakon arrived in late September he had to draw up his fleet between Cumbraes and Cunningham in preparation for a landing at Largs.
    There was a great storm during the night of October 1/2 and many Norwegian ships, out of control, were driven ashore out of the reach of effective help from those ships still under control. During the night and the next day the Norwegians were attacked and slaughtered. King Hakon withdrew with serious loss of both ships and men and died in Orkney on the return journey to Norway. Adapted from W. Croft Dickenson, Scotland from earliest times to 1603, (Thomas Nelson & Sons) 1961, p. 41
  4. Chronicle of Walter of Guisborough, as translated in Scottish Independence (1100-1329) An Archive Teaching Unit, (Scottish Centre for Social Subjects), p 55; J. Stevenson, Documents Illustrative of the History of Scotland. 1286-1306, (H.M. Register house.) Edinburgh 1870 Vol ii, no. 26
  5. Bartholomew Cotton, Historia Anglicana (ed. Luard Rolls Series), 312, this says the dead were, on Edward's orders, counted under the close supervision of Earl Patrick of Dunbar and Sir John Benstead and numbered some 10,052 (This is probably an exaggeration). Given in G.W.S. Barrow Robert Bruce & the Community of the Realm., (Edinburgh University Press) 1988, p 340 note 14.
  6. Stevenson, op. cit, no.455.
  7. Chronicle of Guisborough. op. cit. p 61; Via the Fords of Drip referred to as a crossing in 1304, J. Bain Calendar of Documents relating to Scotland., (H.M. General register House) Edinburgh 1887, vol ii, nos 1462, 1470
  8. Chronicle of Guisborough. op. cit. p 65. Guisborough either makes a slip when he refers to the "foresta de Selkyrke" or makes a mistake, for there is agreement that this battle was fought either at or beside Falkirk. The actual site of the battle, to my knowledge, still remains a mystery and so with reference to the sources I have attempted to place the site and hence my map (p) can be consulted.
  9. Chronicle of John of Fordun, as translated in Scottish Independence (1100-1329) An Archive Teaching Unit, (Scottish Centre for Social Subjects), p 118-9.
  10. Ibid; J Barbour, The Bruce. ed. A.A.H. Douglas (Macllellan) 1964, p83.
  11. Ibid. p 188; Bain, op.cit. nos. 129-33
  12. Ibid, nos. 136-42; Chronicle of Guisborough. op. cit. p 69.
  13. Barbour. op. cit. p 235-6; Chronicle of Fordun.,120.
  14. Scalacronica. The reigns of Edward I, Edward II & Edward III. translated by Sir Herbert Maxwell (Glasgow) 1907 . p 141; Barbour, op. cit, p 275.
  15. Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland. 1956-7 xc XI "Bannockburn a study in military History" General Sir P. Christison. 177.
  16. Barbour, op. cit. p 292.
  17. Barbour, op.cit. p 299.
  18. Christison op. cit., 177
  19. Although a Flemish army armed with pikes had destroyed the flower of French chivalry at Courtrai in 1302.


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Bain. J. Calendar of Documents relating to Scotland (H.M. Register House), 1870.
Barbour. J The Bruce. ed. A.A.H. Douglas (MacLellan), 1964.
Barron. Dr. E.M. The Scottish War of Independence (Carruthers), 1934.
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Barrow G.W.S. Robert Bruce & the Community of the Realm (Edinburgh University Press), 1988.
Brown. P. Hume. A Short History of Scotland. ed. H.W. Meikle (Oliver & Boyd), 1955.
Christison. Gen. Sir P. "Bannockburn- A study in military history"- Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland, 1959.
Dickenson. W. Croft. Scotland from earliest times to 1603 (Thomas Nelson & sons.), 1961.
Dickenson. W. Croft, Donaldson. D., Milne. I.A. A Source book of Scottish History (Thomas Nelson & sons), 1958.
Duncan. Prof. A.M. Scottish Independence (1100-1329) An Archive Teaching Unit (Scottish Centre for Social Subjects).
Ferguson. J. William Wallace- Guardian of Scotland. (MacLehose), 1938.
Glover. J.R. The Story of Scotland (Faber & Faber), 1960.
Lydon. J.F. "The Hobelar- An Irish contribution to medieval warfare." & "An Irish Army in Scotland 1296"- The Irish Sword, Volumes II & V, 1954 & 1962.
MacKenzie Dr. A.M. Robert Bruce King of Scots (MacLehose), 1934.
MacKenzie Dr. W.M. Bannockburn: A Study in medieval warfare (MacLehose), 1989.
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Morris J.E. Bannockburn (Cambridge University Press), 1914.
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Oakeshott R.Ewart A knight & his horse (London), 1962.
Oakeshott R.Ewart A knight & his weapons (London), 1965.
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Map references are given thus: [Map A (4)]

Battle of Dunbar 1296  A. Battle of Dunbar. page 1(a)
Battle of Stirling Bridge 1297 B. Battle of Stirling Bridge  page 4(a)
Battle of Falkirk 1298 C. Battle of Falkirk page 6(a)
Battle of the Pass of Brander 1308 D. Pass of Brander page 9(a)
Battle of Bannockburn 1314 Map 1 E. Battle of Bannockburn - Map x page 12(a)
Battle of Bannockburn 1314 Map 2 E. Battle of Bannockburn - Map y page 13(a)
From Ordnance Survey maps:
  • NS 87/97 Falkirk (south)
  • NN 02/12 Loch Awe (north)
  • NT 67/77 Dunbar (Pathfinder 409)
Old Ordnance survey Maps
  • Stirling North 1896- Stirling sheet 10.15
  • St. Ninians 1896- Stirling Sheet 17.07